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THE MAKING OF THE 
THEORY OF SOCIAL 
REPRESENTATIONS
IVANA MARKOVÁ
ABSTRACT
This paper presents the theory of social representations as a model of social 
scientific theory. In doing so, it attempts to reconstruct the foundations of the 
theory of social representations by focusing on intellectual resources that were 
available to Serge Moscovici during the time he was developing the theory. These 
resources shaped his epistemology, and firmly distinguished the theory of social 
representations from other social psychological approaches. The focus on these 
intellectual resources draws attention to two issues. First, in contrast to what 
Moscovici often called ‘one or two sentence theories’ in social psychology based 
on the manipulation of variables, the theory of social representations is built on 
a rich set of presuppositions. Second, an explicit recognition of presuppositions of 
social representations in their application in professional practices like education, 
politics and health, among others, enables a unique contribution to social sciences 
and humanities.
THEORY OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS • SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL 
APPROACH • EPISTEMOLOGY
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I
n ThiS TRiBuTe To SeRge MoSCoviCi i ShAll pReSenT The TheoRy of SoCiAl 
representations as a model of social scientific theory that shows the 
originality and creativity of his thought. In doing so, I shall attempt 
to reconstruct the foundations of the theory of social representations 
by focusing on intellectual resources that were available to Moscovici 
during the time he was developing the theory. These resources 
shaped his epistemology, and firmly distinguished the theory of social 
representations from other social psychological approaches. The focus 
on these intellectual resources will draw attention to two issues. First, in 
contrast to what Moscovici often called “one or two sentence theories” 
in social psychology based on the manipulation of variables, the theory 
of social representations is built on a rich set of presuppositions. Unless 
one understands the nature of intellectual resources that underlie these 
presuppositions, one cannot answer questions about similarities and 
differences between our theory and those of other theories, e.g. “social 
cognition” or “discourse analysis”, and so on. Due to the fact that the 
theory of social representations deals with interdisciplinary issues of 
high complexity, its “translation” into other approaches is unfortunately 
often trivialized. Second, an explicit recognition of presuppositions of 
social representations in their application in professional practices 
like education, politics and health, among others, enables a unique 
contribution to social sciences and humanities (MARKOVÁ, 2016).
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THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Serge Moscovici arrived to Paris in January 1948 from Romania, where 
he had experienced racism, discrimination and the rise of communist 
totalitarianism. He thought that social psychology was a discipline that 
had the potential of finding solutions to these issues, as well to the 
post-War political, economic and industrial problems. He (MOSCOVICI, 
1961) expressed these views in the Preface to the 1st edition of his 
book La psychanalyse: son image et son public in 1961 where he argued 
that social psychology occupies a unique and strategic position 
between social sciences, and specifically, between sociology and social 
anthropology. He referred in this context to visions expressed by two 
very different social scientists: the French sociologist Emil Durkheim 
and the Russian Marxist and a political philosopher Georgi Plekhanov. 
Despite their tremendous political and philosophical differences, these 
two scholars had a common concern: the study of social knowledge. 
While Durkheim examined social knowledge in the realm of sociology, 
Plekhanov drew attention to possible contributions of social psychology 
in the field of political knowledge. From their different positions they 
both thought that the strategic position of social psychology was given 
by its potential to act in response to contemporary political, historical 
and social phenomena. Thus from the very beginning, Moscovici 
articulated social psychology as a discipline in movement, which has 
its specificity. It is doubly orientated with respect to several kinds of 
dyadic micro-social and macro-social relations in tension (FAUCHEUX; 
MOSCOVICI, 1962), for example, individuals and groups, personality 
and culture, psychology and sociology, and so on. As a hybrid discipline 
in a continuous movement, social psychology has to cope with tensions 
produced by these dyadic relations. Indeed, it is the study of these 
tensions that constitutes the challenge to and specificity of social 
psychology. Moscovici pursued their study throughout his career in 
building social psychology as an international social science through the 
Unesco, in developing the theory of social representations, of minority 
innovations and in his participation in the ecological movement 
(MOSCOVICI; MARKOVÁ, 2006).
inTeLLeCTuaL resourCes oF THe THeorY oF 
SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND COMMUNICATION
COMMON SENSE AND SCIENCE
The study of psychoanalysis, which Moscovici chose to study 
social representations, brought to light the tension between scientific 
and professional thought on the one hand, and the daily thinking of 
ordinary people on the other. Psychoanalysis was particularly suitable 
to explore this tension because it was highly controversial and widely 
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talked about. It had considerable affinities with common sense 
thinking and therefore, lay people had their own views about it. They 
saw similarities between psychoanalysis and various kinds of their 
daily experiences, for example, between a religious confession and a 
psychoanalytic interview.
Many French scholars promoted the idea that science and 
common sense were not only discontinuous phenomena, but that 
scientific thinking was “superior” while daily thought was “inferior”. As 
Moscovici (MOSCOVICI; HEWSTONE, 1983) pointed out, “several labels 
have been used to describe the discontinuity between these two kinds of 
thinking: logic and myth, ‘domestic’ and ‘savage’ thought (LÉVI-STRAUSS, 
1962/1966), ‘logical and pre-logical mentality’ (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1922/1923), 
‘critical’ and ‘automatic’ thought (MOSCOVICI; HEWSTONE, 1983)”. 
All these opposites referred to the presumed superiority of scientific 
thought and inferiority of daily thinking (MARKOVÁ, 2016). Instead, 
Moscovici promoted the perspective of a continuous development of 
thought from common sense to science. Equally important, scientific 
thought gets diffused into daily thinking. As is well known, the idea of 
the transformation of scientific thinking into common sense has been 
vital in the development of the theory.
ELEMENTS VERSUS STRUCTURED WHOLES
In the post-War years, Norbert Wiener (1948) defined a new 
interdisciplinary field, i.e. cybernetics, or the scientific study of control, 
information and communication in animals and machines. Cybernetics 
re-focused interest of sciences on investigations of systems and their 
structures. It brought to attention the concept of information and 
communication as essential organizing mechanisms in domains 
that proceeded beyond the study of the individual into community, 
like anthropology and sociology. Wiener argued that one could not 
understand communities without a thorough exploration of the means 
of communication in social systems. He showed that individuals do not 
create a group or community in order to achieve homeostasis, but that, in 
contrast, society is created in and through heterogeneous disturbances, 
tensions, and various kinds of interactions among members, and their 
modes of communication. 
Cybernetics appealed to Moscovici for several reasons. In 
contrast to theoretical approaches that focused on behavioural and 
mental elements, cybernetics orientated thinking towards the holistic 
idea of Gestalt, towards systems, structures and communication.
COMMUNICATION
Wiener’s vision of society and interaction contradicted the 
established linear formula of communication as “who” says “what” 
to “whom” and with “what effect”. Instead, Wiener was concerned 36
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with patterns and configurations in systems and communication. 
The concepts of “structuredness” and “formness” in cybernetics 
fundamentally contrasted with the concepts of “elements” or “stimuli”, 
and with their aggregates that prevailed in behaviouristic approaches 
in communication at the time. Communication and language are 
phenomena based on various kinds of tension between speakers 
and listeners essential to the concept of social representations. 
Representations are formed, maintained and changed in and through 
language and communication and equally, the use of words and 
attributes attached to meanings transforms social representations. 
Heterogeneous interactions between groups and their specific 
contexts produce a variety of styles of thinking and communicating, some 
based on consensus, others on dissensus and contradiction. Communication 
does not necessarily lead to a better understanding, harmony and progress. 
In contrast to the ascent theory of knowledge towards science and “true 
knowledge” that has been adopted for example, by Durkheim and Piaget, 
the theory of social representations does not presuppose progress towards 
higher forms of knowledge or towards the more adequate representations 
(MARKOVÁ, 2003). Instead, it presupposes transformation of one kind 
of knowledge into another one; and transformation of various kinds of 
knowledge is pertinent to specific socio-historical and cultural conditions. 
Moscovici (1961; 1976) coined these diverse kinds of thinking and 
communicating as cognitive polyphasia, the simultaneous and dynamic 
co-existence of different modalities of thinking and knowledge, like 
traditional and modern or ritualistic and scientific. Cognitive polyphasia 
is characterized by tension, conflict and constraints rather than by 
equilibrium and adaptation.
FROM ATTITUDES TO SOCIAL REPRESENTATION
Already in his first article Moscovici (1952) expressed his strong 
dissatisfaction with the use of scales in order to examine opinions about, 
and attitudes towards psychoanalysis, as his supervisors advised him. As 
he explained in his first published papers, the results from scales give 
yes-no answers; they are concerned only with measurement, but one 
does not learn about how people think. At that time Moscovici (1953) 
discovered Guttman’s scales. He saw the originality of Guttman’s scales 
because they sampled ideas rather than the respondents’ attitudes. 
Guttman (1954; 1959) attempted to discover the structures of items 
binding respondents together. Patterns, in which items were closer 
together, represented meaningful and socially shared Gestalts. They 
expressed the degree of structuredness of social phenomena. The degree 
of structuredness was the concept that was already present in Wiener’s 
cybernetics and now Moscovici found it also in Guttman’s scales. He 
understood that Guttman’s scale offered an approach enabling the study 
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networks and interactions among items, evaluation and transformation 
of knowledge, and moralizing about these issues. Importantly, it was not 
transformation of neutral information, but of value-loaded knowledge 
that groups and societies accumulated in and through culture over 
generations: it was ethical. I found it interesting that Moscovici’s first 
articles on questioning and rejecting attitudes and opinions as unsuitable 
concepts for his own study also revealed his personal dilemma. He 
was developing new thoughts against the established knowledge 
and the existing research practices. These first articles indicated his 
struggle with his own ideas, and his awareness that he confronted the 
establishment. He did not intend to validate psychoanalysis as good 
or bad. Instead, he tried to capture social representations, which are 
dynamic and heterogeneous social phenomena. This can be achieved 
only by intensive investigations enabling exchange and development of 
ideas and their circulation in groups. He carefully introduced in his first 
papers the concept of the Guttman scale opposing the established views 
in France at that time. He came to Paris as a political refugee in 1948 
and when he published his first articles in 1952 and 1953, he still did 
not have the French citizenship. Not surprisingly, he found it difficult to 
present his unauthorized views. 
Claude Faucheux and Moscovici had introduced the Guttman’s 
approach to the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, who saw its value for 
structuralism. He thought that the design of Guttman’s questionnaire 
was a revolutionary discovery, because one could mathematically show 
patterns or structures in social phenomena. Lévi-Strauss however 
never accepted the theory of social representations which was based 
on common sense rather than on “science”. Serge Moscovici remarked 
that Lévi-Strauss tried to scientify everything. For example he tried to 
use the laws of thermodynamics to study kinship, family, religion and 
cultures. Using the thermodynamic notion of entropy, which refers to 
the measure of disorder in systems, Lévi-Strauss stated that anthropology 
should be renamed as entropology, that is, as a thermodynamic study of 
human processes (LÉVI-STRAUSS, 1961, p. 397).
The brief intellectual history shows that the question “what is 
the difference between attitudes and social representations?” cannot 
be answered by listing their similar and diverse characteristics. From 
the very beginning Moscovici was interested in the study of dynamic 
nature of social phenomena and this kind of inquiry is underlain by an 
epistemology that is incompatible with the study of attitudes in social 
psychology. 
THE PROLETARIAN AND BOURGEOIS SCIENCE
When Moscovici was developing social representations of 
psychoanalysis, two terms, the “bourgeois” and the “proletarian” 36
3
Iva
n
a
 M
a
rko
v
á
C
a
d
e
r
n
o
s
 d
e
 P
e
s
q
u
is
a
   v.4
7
 n
.16
3
 p
.3
5
8
-3
74
 ja
n
./m
a
r. 2
0
17
   3
6
5
      
sciences were applied by the French Communist Party to various sciences 
like physics, mathematics or chemistry and also to psychoanalysis 
(LECOURT, 1977). This was a follow up of the Soviet Marxists. 
Psychoanalysis was a conceived as a “bourgeois” science. It would be 
difficult to explain, today, what the distinction between “proletarian” 
and “bourgeois” science meant; it was considered by its proponents to 
be part of a “class struggle”. It was a Party matter and it was believed 
that only enlightened proletariat could objectively evaluate science. 
But while the “proletarian science” aimed at re-organizing working 
relations, rationalization, centralization and planning the direction of 
labour, it was believed that the proletariat needed guidance. According 
to the Marxist-Leninist view, ordinary people are spontaneous and they 
cannot think rationally and scientifically.
Moscovici’s aim was to rehabilitate common sense and other 
forms of practical daily thinking. He strongly argued against the 
view that “people do not think” (MOSCOVICI; MARKOVÁ, 2000). As 
Moscovici notes in Psychoanalysis, this was such a controversial issue 
that some scientists left the Communist Party, while others wrote 
personal critiques and confessions rejecting their previous adherence 
to psychoanalysis. The question of the “proletarian science” was never 
resolved, yet the opposition to the idea that people cannot think was a 
strong intellectual resource in Moscovici’s development of his theory.
THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND COMMON SENSE
Among important intellectual resources of the theory of social 
representations were Moscovici’s studies of the history and philosophy 
of science of the 16th and 17th centuries. These were informed, above 
all, by the work of the philosopher of science Alexandre Koyré, the 
Russian émigré who lived in Paris. Koyré (1948) argued that just like 
in ancient Greece so in the 17th century, technological and scientific 
thinking were independent modes of thought. Technological thinking 
was common sense thinking. While in ancient Greece these two kinds 
of thought remained independent, in the 17th century, science and 
technology absorbed each other’s elements. Science adopted common 
sense elements, developed them and adapted them to new knowledge 
and practical needs. Thus common sense and scientific knowing started 
enriching one another and this idea of stimulating for Moscovici.
Subsequently, Koyré’s ideas prompted Moscovici (1966) to 
suggest that innovation and scientific revolutions do not arise from 
deficits and anomalies as Thomas Kuhn (1962) proposed, but from a 
“surplus”. Kuhn characterised a change of paradigms in terms of severe 
and prolonged anomalies which he viewed as necessary preconditions 
for crises, and subsequently, for the emergence of new theories. In his 
critique of Kuhn, Moscovici argued that the idea of anomalies or deficits 
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was too simplistic. Scientific changes do not take place on their own, but 
they are part of changes in the world, including economy, philosophy, 
communications, arts and technology, which all mutually interact. 
Transformation of ideas from technology and arts into science and vice 
versa was fruit of the freedom of thought, curiosity, imagination, and 
taking risks during the scientific revolution. The revolution changed 
the structure of thought and practices in all these disciplines: it changed 
their epistemologies.
Thus Moscovici (1966) suggests that it is not that there are too 
many unresolved problems in science as Kuhn thinks, but because 
there are too many “new truths” which form a “surplus”. Carriers of 
these new truths are individuals or groups, or minorities that work at 
the margins of technology and science, and whose “surplus” eventually 
turns them into a cohesive scientific theory and technology.
PHENOMENOLOGY
After the War, phenomenology became one of the flourishing 
philosophical tendencies in France. Paul Ricoeur maintained that 
Husserl was read, translated and commented on in France more than 
anywhere else. Phenomenology appealed to Moscovici for several 
reasons. It is holistic and does not fragment the world into elements. 
Human consciousness is intentional and is directed towards objects 
and other humans. It is concerned with contents of experience, which 
include imagination, judgements, emotions, self- and other-awareness 
and interactions.
When Moscovici was developing the theory of social 
representations, one of the main representatives of phenomenology 
in France was Maurice Merleau-Ponty. There were at least three main 
sources of ideas in Merleau-Ponty’s work that that were important for 
the theory of social representations.
First, following Husserl’s concept of “Lebenswelt”, Merleau-
Ponty (1964) emphasized life-experience as a dynamic and open system. 
He fundamentally disapproved of the Piaget conception of the child 
intellectual development from illogicality towards logicality. In contrast to 
Piaget, Merleau-Ponty emphasised the child’s representation of the body 
as a “lived experience”, and as a relation between activities like speaking, 
thinking, listening, knowing, imagining, among others. He did not view 
child’s representations as inadequate or irrational, which gradually, 
through the passage of cognitive stages, finally reach a mature and logical 
adult thinking. Instead, he thought that the child’s representation at a 
given time is adequately adapted to his/her lived experience.
The second source of ideas for social representations was the 
phenomenology of language and this, in fact, is an expansion of the first 
point concerning the body. For Merleau-Ponty (1960/1964), the living 36
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body embraces the totality of the individual’s sense-making and self-
creating of the world, whether by gazing at an object, painting a picture 
or, perhaps most importantly, by speaking. The analysis of speech and 
expression shows the importance of living body more effectively than 
any other kinds of activity. The phenomenological perspective focuses 
on the speaking subject in the living community and is orientated 
towards the future.
Third, Moscovici claimed that it was Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/1962) 
Phenomenology of perception that helped him to crystallize the concept of 
representation. Here we also find a fundamental difference between 
phenomenology and the theory of social representations. In contrast to 
Merleau-Ponty who emphasized the primacy of perception, Moscovici 
emphasized the primacy of social representation. As he stated: “this is 
what fixed this notion in my mind, how it was associated with certain 
ideas on the relationship between communication and knowledge, 
and the transformation of the content of knowledge” (MOSCOVICI; 
MARKOVÁ, 2000, p. 233).
MAKING ETHICAL CHOICES
From his early years shaped by the Second World War, Nazism 
and Stalinism, Moscovici placed the study of ethical choices, values 
and social norms into the center of his attention with regard to the 
meaning of humanity. As he reveals in his autobiography Chronique des 
années égares,(MOSCOVICI, 1997) in his early youth he found inspiration 
in Nietzsche’s philosophical thoughts, in Pascal’s (1670/1995) Pensées 
and in Spinoza’s (1677/1967) Ethics. Here he scrutinized passions that, 
throughout the long past of mankind, tore apart communities as 
well as brought them together. Within broad historical and cultural 
contexts he pondered about ethical values guiding beliefs in justice, the 
search for progress, and the desire of humans for immortality. In his 
autobiographical portrayal, there are several sources of ideas concerning 
ethics, both personal and scientific, but all of them converging together. 
On the personal side, experience of anti-semitism, persecution 
and humiliation during and after the War became the formative 
foundation of ideas expressed already in his first publication in the 
journal that Serge Moscovici co-edited with his friends in Bucharest. 
Later on, during his social scientific research in France, inspirations from 
Blaise Pascal, that he described in his autobiography, in particular those 
relating to science and religion, and ethics and morality, came to the 
fore. When Moscovici became acquainted with Durkheim’s writings, he 
focused on the fact that ethics was omnipresent is all social phenomena, 
and that it was conceptualized in different manners, whether in sacred, 
or in profane spheres. In contrast to Durkheim, Moscovici viewed ethics 
as interaction, as dynamic, and as being permeated with ideas about 
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the driving forces of human invention and innovation. He brought into 
foreground intellectual polemics concerning values and ethical standards 
of different modes of thinking, like scientific, religious and public. 
Making ethical choices is a fundamental feature of the epistemology 
of common sense and the theory of social representations (MARKOVÁ, 
2016). It is the capacity that makes our species human beings. Making 
evaluation and judgements of events and others is indispensable in all 
interactions in daily living. 
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL
I mentioned at the beginning that Moscovici articulated social psychology 
as a discipline in movement that is doubly orientated with respect to 
several kinds of dyadic micro-social and macro-social relations in tension. 
Among these doubly orientated relations in tension, the relation between 
the “individual” and “social” was of particular significance. It is these 
notions that are most relevant to Moscovici’s life-long question: What 
is social psychology? And even more precisely: what is “social” in social 
psychology? He thought that in contrast to other social sciences, social 
psychology has avoided the quest concerning what it means by “social”. 
In political economy and history, Karl Marx made understandable what 
was “social” in his theories. “Social” referred to social classes and Marx 
well defined their historical role, although he did not pay much attention 
to what was “individual”. Antonio Gramsci, following Marx, emphasized 
social psychological, cognitive and linguistic features of popular beliefs. 
Sociologists like Max Weber or Talcott Parsons also made it clear what 
was “social” in their theories. Max Weber’s theory of social stratification 
is based on social class, social status and political Party. Talcott Parsons 
developed a cultural theory of society based on the structure of action. 
Sigmund Freud, on his part, made it evident what he meant by the 
“individual” when he postulated the “id”, “ego” and “superego”. He also 
clarified what was “social” in therapeutic practices and in his theory of 
culture. But, Moscovici puzzled, what was “social” in social psychology? 
There was no theory about that. Equally, he thought that there was no 
concept of the “individual” in social psychology. 
Moscovici (1972/2000) elaborated on both issues already in the 
early 1970s when he referred to “taxonomic social psychology”. In 
taxonomic social psychology, the relations between the “individual” 
and “social”, amount to aggregates rather than to interactions. The 
studies in taxonomic social psychology categorize individuals, e.g. 
males and females, young and old people, Catholics and Protestants, 
and measure degrees of their capacities or features, e.g. prejudice, trust, 
attitudes, opinions, and so on. Who are individuals in such studies? 
Individuals are undifferentiated and undefined entities without history, 36
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without culture, and without face. They are not conceived as persons 
but as taxonomies, and the purpose of research is to study correlations 
between taxonomies and variables attributed to them. “Social” here 
means that these variables are to be found in different degrees in any 
individual who belongs to this or that taxonomy or category. This way of 
thinking justifies the use of inductive techniques in the study attitudes, 
intelligence, motives, and other capacities. This approach ignores that 
humans live in societies and are differentiated from one another in 
many ways; it ignores that humans develop and change, experience 
their cultures and that they communicate. The theory of knowledge, 
on which such studies are based, does not tell us what it means to be 
“individual” or “social”; “the individual” is an entity characterized by the 
number one; “the social” are entities (e.g. group, society) characterized 
by a number higher than one; those who are supposedly members of 
a group belong to the “in-group”. Those, who do not belong to it, are 
members of the “out-group”. However, Moscovici argued, society is not 
made of individuals. The fact that 2-3 individuals think together does 
not make a society. 
In his life-long search to answer what is “social” and “individual”, 
Serge Moscovici (1970; 1972/2000) postulated that one cannot conceptualize 
the social and individual as two separate entities. Instead, the Self and 
Other(s) (or the Ego-Alter) are mutually interdependent in and through 
interaction. The Ego-Alter jointly generate their social reality – objects 
of knowledge, beliefs or images. Here we already have the basis of 
the triangular interaction the Ego-Alter-Object in the theory of social 
representations and it the theory of innovation of minorities. The concept 
of the interdependence between the Ego-Alter-Object sharply separates 
the theory of social representations from theories based on social 
perception like that of Fritz Heider. Heider (1958) claimed that humans 
perceive objects differently than people and therefore, they differently 
explain events involving people and objects. Heider’s hypothesis 
attributes judgement, reasoning and explanation to perception. It 
focuses on the nature of the perceived entity, i.e. either on a person or an 
object, rather than on the relation (or interaction) between the perceiver 
and person or an object. Heider focuses on duality of the Self and the 
Other: they are conceived as separate from one another. Instead, we 
must focus on interaction between the Ego and the Alter, and on their 
relations. The way in which the Ego selects the aspects of the situation 
is partly determined by his/her social experience, by intentions and 
expectations and by comprehension of that situation. When we apply 
this theoretical perspective to the theory of social representations, here 
relations come first; they combine and use individuals’ intellectual 
capacities in multiple manners. Individuals can express their ideas in 
different ways using specific words, gestures and symbols.
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INTERACTIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY IN 
ProFessionaL PraCTiCes
The discussion of intellectual resources underlying Moscovici’s 
interactional epistemology of the Ego-Alter-Object leads us to practical 
applications and methodological implications of this perspective. The 
triangular relation the Ego-Alter-Object is dynamic and infinitely open. 
Depending on researchers’ and professionals’ interests, and problems 
they intend to explore, it allows for integrating further interactional 
concepts. Consider some examples.
INTEGRATING INTERACTIONAL CONCEPTS
Bauer and Gaskell (1999) expand the Ego-Alter-Object triangle by 
focusing on the time dimension in the construction of common sense 
meanings. The authors represent the triangle as an elongated construct 
which captures the past, present and future of common sense meanings. 
The elongated triangle has become known as the Toblerone model like 
the well-known Swiss chocolate.
The authors further point out that the Toblerone model has a 
particular importance for the study of social groups. Groups grow and 
subdivide; in such subdivided groups there is a variety of coexisting 
triangular dynamic structures competing, cooperating or being in 
conflict with one another. Consequently, different kinds of common 
sense dominate in different subgroups at the same time, and may follow 
different paths over time. 
In her exploration of learning as a social process in education, 
Zittoun (2014) develops the Self- Other-Object of knowledge. Focusing 
on semiotic mediation, Zittoun maintains that in addition to interacting 
with the teacher about the Object of knowledge, the pupil is also 
engaged in an inner dialogue with him-/herself, i.e. about the Object 
of knowledge. It is necessary to distinguish between what the pupil 
already knows about the Object of knowledge and between the Object 
of knowledge to which he/she is exposed. Therefore, the pupil’s inner 
dialogue with the Object of knowledge proceeds along two lines.
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One line of the inner dialogue arises from the pupil’s previous 
knowledge and experience, i.e. from the “personal culture”, drawing on 
memory, past experiences and associations. The other line of the inner 
dialogue arises from formal modes of learning to which the pupil is exposed, 
i.e. from what is socially and culturally acknowledged as knowledge. As 
Zittoun (2014) maintains, the process of knowing involves internalization, 
reorganization of previous knowledge and the construction of new 
knowledge. The pupil establishes relations with the Object of knowledge 
in and through choosing cultural and intellectual elements with which he/
she is confronted. This is why Zittoun’s semiotic mediation necessitates 
expanding the original didactic Pupil -Other-Object triangle into a prism, in 
which the Object is captivated by the ‘personal culture’ and by the socially 
and culturally acknowledged lines of thought.
In the field of congenital deafblindness, building on the 
triangularity of the Ego-Alter-Object, Ann Nafstad (2015) explored the 
concept of patients’ resilience showing that its quality was dependent 
on trust that the patient developed in the patient-carer relation. 
Examples of the Toblerone model, the semiotic prism in teacher-
pupil relation or the patient’s resilience in patient-carer interaction 
show that in all cases the authors start with the triangular interaction 
of the Ego-Alter-Object, but in order to solve concrete problems, they 
incorporate further dialogically based concepts. Alex Gillespie once 
aptly stated in personal communication: the epistemological triangle 
can be viewed like a miniature Christmas tree, on which, depending on 
the object of study, one can dangle other dialogical concepts.
SINGLE CASE STUDIES
There is a fundamental empirical significance of the interdependence 
of the Ego-Alter: interdependence means that interaction and communication 
is unique for each dyadic relation. The Ego defines the Alter and 
they transform one another. In concrete terms, in Moscovici’s study 
of social representations of psychoanalysis, the political power of 
the Communist Party and of the Catholic Church, and the citizens’ 
thinking and communications about psychoanalysis formed patterns of 
interdependence. All components exerted a mutual influence on one 
another, and they jointly generated new patterns of knowledge, beliefs 
and images.
3
7
0
T
H
E
 M
A
K
IN
G
 O
F
 T
H
E
 T
H
E
O
R
Y
 O
F
 S
O
C
IA
L
 R
E
P
R
E
S
E
N
T
A
T
IO
N
S
3
7
2
  
 C
a
d
e
r
n
o
s
 d
e
 P
e
s
q
u
is
a
  
 v
.4
7
 n
.1
6
3
 p
.3
5
8
-3
74
 j
a
n
./
m
a
r.
 2
0
17
If we adopt the perspective that the Ego-Alter forms the unique 
relation, this implies that Moscovici’s study of psychoanalysis in the 
late 1950s as a social representation was a single case study. Equally, 
Jodelet’s (1989/1991) study of social representations of madness was 
a single historical event. The fundamental theoretical contribution 
of these studies was the treatment of participants and of their socio-
cultural contexts as interdependent. Both the participants and their 
socio-cultural contexts contributed equally significant data to these 
studies. This does not mean that studies based on single cases discard 
the use of questionnaires, experiments and other classic methods used 
in human and social sciences. Single case studies are often wrongly 
confounded with qualitative methods. What is vital to single case 
studies is the concept that the Selves and their socio-cultural context 
are interdependent, both contributing empirical data. 
Angela Arruda (2003) insists that the challenge for researchers 
studying social representations is to develop methods suitable for 
cultural research. In a similar way, Valsiner (2014) argues that cultural 
psychologists should conceive ‘the centrality of culture within the 
human psyche’ as a clear axiomatic stand. Considering the Alter, whether 
culture or institutions, as vital in the study of social representations, 
clearly separates social representations from attitudes or opinions. 
If we focus on the professional perspective, the study of 
unique single cases is not only effective but also most meaningful. 
Yet, this unavoidably leads to the notorious question: can one make 
any generalizations from findings based on single cases? Sciences 
and professions aim at providing credible knowledge that would be 
applicable to diverse cases and conditions and therefore, this issue, 
throughout the history of science and professional disciplines, has been 
considered to be of vital importance. 
Single case studies cannot be submitted to statistical generalization 
leading to “universal truth” and “universally valid knowledge” based on 
inductive approaches. Instead, they can be generalized through theories 
underpinning single case studies. Already Charles Sanders Peirce 
(1931-1958) argued that the researcher or professional constructs 
a preliminary theory on the basis of careful observation of real life 
phenomena which are in front of him/her. The researcher observes 
an event as a whole, and devises a preliminary theory concerning that 
whole by means of intuition (or what Peirce called instinct). In using 
intuitive knowledge or a preliminary theory, the researcher must be 
prepared to discard or to change it if it proves to be irrelevant. 
The findings from a unique event have implications for studies 
of similar kinds and for generalizations of theories. For example, one 
can pose the question as to whether intellectual polemics, forms of 
thinking and the clash of new ideas with the established values are 37
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transferable to studies of social representations other than those 
represented by the case of psychoanalysis in France in the late nineteen 
fifties. The forces that are functional in one historical case do not leave 
any components stable over time, whether they concern the data 
gathered from participants (interviews, the media) or interpretations 
from cultural historical and social situations. 
Professional practitioners are aware of the uniqueness of each 
individual and of each interaction between the client/patient on the 
one hand, and the practitioner or therapeutic team on the other hand. 
This is why theoretical generalization is particularly important in 
dialogically based professional practices like education, psychotherapy, 
and practices involving the care and/or cure of, people with disorders of 
language and communication.
ConCLusion
I have gone very rapidly through some Moscovici’s intellectual 
resources. They constitute a coherent interdisciplinary framework. 
The Self and Others always form a unique relationship: one defines the 
other. Therefore, the meaningful methodological approach is a single 
case study based on the interaction and interdependence of the Self 
and Other and their transformation, rather than on inductive studies 
based on the manipulation of variables from subjects. There is always a 
danger that the researcher or professional slips into an inductive study 
of attitudes or opinions and calls such a study “social representations”. 
The aim of this tribute to Serge Moscovici was to emphasize 
the originality of his thought in developing the theory of social 
representations. In order to preserve and further develop his heritage, 
it is vital to pay the fullest attention to the rich repertoire of intellectual 
resources from which he created the network of coherent concepts. 
Above all, these include dyadic micro- and macro-social relations in 
tension, which constitute the epistemology of common sense. They 
involve the Ego-Alter interdependence, the Ego-Alter-Object theory of 
knowledge, the holistic and dynamic structuredness of representations 
and communication, and making ethical choices.
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